Promises to Keep: We are the Constitution's Framers by Lawrence, Charles R. III
Promises to Keep: 
We are the Constitution's Framers* 
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, III*'" 
In 1952, when my parents moved out of New York City to the 
suburb of Spring Valley, N.Y., I was one of two Black kids in my 
fourth grade class. There were three of us wearing "All the Way with 
Adlai" buttons amidst a sea of "I like Ikes." And when Mrs. Rose 
allowed us to bring our radios in to listen to the Subway Series be-
tween the Yankees and the Dodgers, there were five of us cheering our 
hearts out for the Bums from Brooklyn and against what was then 
America's team, the Yanks. Eisenhower and the Yankees won and 
"Under God" was inserted into the Pledge of Allegiance between 
"One Nation' and With Liberty and Justice for All." 
I mouthed but did not vocalize the last two words of the Pledge. 
I'd seen the sign at the lake resort outside of town that read "No Nig-
gers, Jews or dogs allowed." I did not know then that in the year of 
my birth the U.S. Supreme Court had held that I could not be com-
pelled to say the Pledge to the Flag, but I did know that I was not 
among the "all" to which the Pledge referred. 
The following spring my family travelled south to visit relatives. 
We packed picnic lunches and dinners to avoid the humiliation of be-
ing sent to the back door of diners. My parents had grown up in Mis-
sissippi and were veterans at coping with Jim Crow. By avoiding the 
segregated eateries and hostelries of the South, we were laying the evi-
dentiary foundation for the Commerce Clause argument the Supreme 
Court would rely upon ten years later, but I had no awareness of my 
part in constitutional history. 
That May, Brown v. Board of Education 1 was decided. Although 
I'd heard of the NAACP and even met Thurgood Marshall at a 
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church dinner, I think that this was the first time I had heard of the 
Supreme Court. There was much rejoicing in my house. Nine white 
men in black robes had lifted the veil of legally sanctioned segregation 
from our heads. But even at the tender age of ten, I sensed that Brown 
was not so much a benignly bestowed gift as the fruit of a hard won 
struggle. Even at this young age, I understood that the struggle had 
just begun. 
While I sensed intuitively that the Constitution only protected 
those who protected themselves, I also had a naive idealism about the 
nature of constitutional struggle. I was able to confront my classmates 
face to face. We played ball and cut class together and fought over 
whether Mickey Mantle or Willie Mays was the better centerflelder. 
When as a high school student, I picketed the local Woolworths and 
asked my white buddies not to patronize them because their stores in 
the South would not serve Blacks at the lunch counter, they honored 
my request. I was a friend whose humanity was important to them. 
They promised only to shoplift and not to buy. When we sponsored a 
Pete Seeger concert to raise money for SANE, the local chapter of the 
American Legion picketed the concert. It was a cold day and we 
served coffee to the picketers, most of them fathers of my classmates, 
and talked politics face· to face. When I refused to participate in a 
nationwide civil defense drill, the guys on the football team asked why. 
I told them and they listened and thought. I was more skeptical than 
most of my friends about the constitutional platitudes we were fed in 
civics class, but I was a romantic about the possibilities of the struggle. 
On May 6 of this year, United States Supreme Court Justice 
Thurgood Marshall delivered a speech entitled "Celebrating the Con-
stitution. A Dissent."2 Justice Marshall distanced himself from the 
flag-waving fervor and celebratory spirit that has been the hallmark of 
this year's 200th birthday of the U.S. Constitution. He began his 
speech as follows: 
Like many anniversary celebrations, this one takes particular 
events and holds them up as the source of all the very best that has 
followed. Patriotic feelings will surely swell, prompting proud proc-
lamations of the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice shared by 
the Framers and reflected in a written document now yellowed with 
age. This is unfortunate-not the patriotism itself but the tendency 
2. Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 How. L.J., 623 (1987). 
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to oversimplify, to overlook the many other events that have been 
instrumental to our achievements as a nation. The focus of this cel-
ebration invites a complacent belief that the vision of those who 
debated and compromised in Philadelphia yielded the "more perfect 
Union" it is said we now enjoy. 
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the 
meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia 
Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of jus-
tice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound. 3 
939 
A Washington Post article reporting Justice Marshall's speech be-
gan by asking, "Is Justice Thurgood Marshall the Grinch of the Con-
stitution's 200th birthday party?,,4 My mother called that same day 
and said, "Did you read what Thurgood said about the constitutional 
bicentennial? Wasn't it wonderful? That man made my week." 
My mother had voiced a response to Justice Marshall's words 
that was echoed the length and breadth of this nation's Black commu-
nity. Many thoughtful whites commended his speech as well, but his 
words were much more than a correct or even an insightful analysis to 
us. His voice was our voice. His articulation of our perspective, of 
what we see and feel daily, was a liberating event. He was Joe Louis 
pummeling Max Schmelling, he was Jackie Robinson making us all 
Brooklyn Dodger fans, he was Muhammed Ali resisting the draft, and 
Martin Luther King preaching a powerful poetic sermon about a 
dream that each of us shared. He was for us what Frederick Douglass 
had been for our great grandparents when on a Fourth of July he said, 
Fellow citizens, pardon me, and allow me to ask, Why am I 
called upon to speak here today? Perhaps, you mean to mock me. 
For what have I to do with your celebration? What, to the Ameri-
can slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, A day that reveals to 
him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and· 
cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration 
is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national 
greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and 
heartless; your denunciation of tyrants, brass-fronted impudence; 
your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery; your prayers 
and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious 
parades and solemnity. are to him. mere bombast, fraud, deception, 
3. /d. at 623-24. 
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940 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30 
impiety, and hypocrisy-a thin veil to cover up crimes which would 
disgrace a nation of savages.5 
Justice Marshall's words and those of America's greatest aboli-
tionist share a common theme. It is a theme which brings our nation's 
ideals and its realities face to face, a theme which confronts us with 
our contradictions. Marshall indicts the founding fathers for devising 
a government which was "defective from the start. ,,6 He notes that 
when the framers used the words "We the people" in the Constitu-
tion's Preamble: 
they did not have in mind the majority of America's citizens .... 
On a matter so basic as the right to vote, Negro slaves were ex-
cluded, although they were counted for representational purposes-
each as three-fifths of a person. Women did not gain the right to 
vote for over a hundred and thirty years.7 
It is important to note that Justice Marshall does not attribute 
these defects to negligence or lack of know-how on the part of the 
Framers. "These omissions were intentional,"s he says. The written 
record of the Framer's debate on slavery cannot be denied. Nor can 
the provisions of the document itself; the "three fifths" provisions in 
Art. I, Sec. 2, the bar on prohibiting the importation of slaves in Art I, 
Sec. 9, and the "fugitive slave" provision of Art. IV, Sec 2. 
Some contemporary commentators have responded to Justice 
Marshall's indictment by arguing that the Constitution cannot be con-
demned for being a creature of its times. They characterize the infa-
mous slavery compromises of 1787, as necessary, if unfortunate, 
decisions influenced by the then prevailing beliefs that slavery was on 
the decline and would soon die of its own weight; that Africans and 
their descendants were a different and inferior breed of beings. That 
the property interests of slave owners were preserved at the cost of 
freedom for Blacks is seen as a small anachronism in an otherwise 
brilliant testament to democracy and individual liberty.9 
But, the slavery compromises were much more than a casual con-
cession to the contemporary mores of the day. The debate over the 
5. H. APTHEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 331, 334 (1967). 
6. Id. Marshall, supra note 2, at 624. 
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morality of slavery was already a vigorous one in 1787, and the fram-
ers knew full well the moral ramifications of what they did. The con-
stitutional dilemma rested not in a failure to understand the 
immorality of the enslavement of other human beings or that slavery 
conflicted with the framers' idealism regarding the worth of the indi-
vidual, but in the conflict between this aspect of individual liberty and 
their more pressing pragmatic concern for the protection of vested 
property and political status based on wealth. 
Recall that for the framers, propertied white men all, property 
was a fundamental extension of the individual, and the social compact 
was chiefly designed to protect those distributions of wealth that they 
saw as arising out of the varying talents and efforts of society's mem-
bers. (Never mind that the largest part of this wealth was produced 
through the labor of those who they held in bondage.) The framers 
simply chose to give priority to one facet of individual liberty over 
another. They chose, quite rationally, to preserve liberty for a very 
limited segment of the national community - themselves. 
Justice Marshall cites Chief Justice Roger Taney's infamous pas-
sage from the Dred Scott case to make his point that the original intent 
of the Framers was "far too clear for any ameliorating construc-
tion."10 "[Negroes] had for more than a century been regarded as be-
ings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
white race ... ; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect.,,11 But as Professor Derrick Bell has 
noted, Chief Justice Taney may have missed the point. "It was not as 
he proclaimed ... that the Constitution's commitment to individual 
liberty was not intended for Africans, but that the Constitution's in-
junctions went to those who owned property-a qualification that ex-
cluded many whites as well as most Blacks."12 
In recent years, I have begun my first constitutional law lecture 
by recollecting a New Yorker cartoon of several years ago. The car-
toon depicts a typical New York Yuppy coc~tail party. One guest, a 
law student explaining his professional goals, said "my short-term in-
terests are in civil liberties but my long-term interests are in real es-
10. Id. at 626. 
II. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
12. Bell, Victims as Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law, Speech delivered 
'to the Yale Law School Legal Theory Workshop, March 26, 1987. 
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tate." I relate this cartoon in part as a challenge to my students not to 
follow suit. But the cartoon also speaks to the constitutional dilemma 
between this nation's commitment to property and its commitment to. 
humanity.. . .' 
The Framers chose property and resolved the apparent contradic-
tion between the primacy of property and the broadly stated commit-
ment to humanity by defining Blacks and other people of color as 
outside the community of human beings. Women were relegated to a 
similar nonparticipatory status by a different but no less effective ideol-· . 
ogy that characterized them as less than fully developed humans, as 
childlike and in need of protection. It should·not surprise us that Ed 
Meese, William Rehnquist and Robert Bork are advocates of original 
intent or that Thurgood Marshall has called for a different vision 'of 
the Constitution, a vision "nurtured through two turbulent centuries 
of our own making.,,13 
The power of Marshall's vision of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is that it includes us-all of us-that it calls upon each of us to be 
active participants in making the Constitution; in deciding which con-
stitutional values will be given primacy. Marshall's vision calls upon 
all of us to be Framers. 
Professor Hanna Pitkin has written that there are two uses of the 
word constitution that do not refer to the Constitution of the United 
States but that are worth attending to in considering how we may give 
meaning to that document. 
"The first of these uses is constitution in the sense of composition 
or fundamental make-up, the constituent parts of something and how 
they are put together, its characteristic frame or nature."14 When we 
speak of a person's constitution we refer to her physical makeup (we 
say she has a robust or a delicate constitution) or of her temperament 
or character. "With respect to a community this use of the word con-
stitution suggests a characteristic way of life, the national character of 
a people, a product of a particular history and social conditions." 15 A 
constitution is SOMETHING WE ARE, a mode of self-articulation. 
"The second use of constitution which deserves our attention is 
its function as a verbal noun pointing to the action or activity of.con-
13. Marshasll, supra note 2, at 627. 
14. Pitkin, The Jdea a/the Constitution, 37 J. OF LEGAL Eo. 167 (1987). 
15. Jd. 
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stituting-that is, of founding, framing, shaping something anew."16 
Constitution describes the human capactiy to make a new beginning. 
A constitution is SOMETHING WE DO. A constitution can be seen 
as activity-as political struggle. As Justice Marshall so aptly pointed 
out, our founding fathers were men, not gods and we have the same 
powers that they exercised in framing our Constitution. We have the 
human capacity for creative action. "We are the species that consti-
tutes itself, that collectively shapes itself, not just genetically through 
reproduction, as all species do, but culturally, through history.,,17 We 
take responsibility for what we are by shaping and doing, but not 
every action we take is a successful extension of our true selves. This 
effort to express our true selves is the subject of constitutional dis-
course, a discourse which should not be restricted to lawyers, judges 
and scholars, but should be engaged in by us all. 
In 1787, the vast majority of us were excluded from this constitu-
tional discourse. The continuing legacy of our exclusion is this: for 
those who are intent on maintaining a status and power gained 
through wealth and property, the contradiction between the ideals of 
liberty and equality and the primacy of property requires a rationaliza-
tion. Some explanation must be devised that hides from us and them-
selves the gaping chasm between the ideal and the real. Constitutional 
doctrine has provided this rationalization in the social Darwinism of 
economic substantive due process, 18 in the intent requirement's disre-
gard of culturally ingrained and therefore often unconsciously moti-
vated racism and sexism,19 or in the state action doctrine's 
immunization of private clubs and corporations from constitutional 
scrutiny.20 
For those of us who have been and continue to be excluded the 
contradiction between the ideal and the real is enabling. We know 
that we are part of a struggle about the meaning of the Constitution, a 
struggle about how we shall be constituted, about who we are and how 
our values are best articulated and acted out .. Professor Jerry Lopez 
16. Id. at 168. 
17. Id. 
IS. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 4S (1905). 
19. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); See also Lawrence. The Id. the Ego and 
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20. Moose Lodge v. Irvis. 407 U.S. 263 (1972); Flagg Brothers. Inc. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 922 
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has said that "[c]onstitutions result from fighting. They establish so-
cial arrangements that express both in their original detail and in their 
ongoing adjustments what fighting continues to be about-not just in 
elections [or constitutional conventions] but in day-to-day living."21 
It is not happenstance that those who have been most oppressed 
in this country have been the keepers of the dream. It is not fortuitous 
that Blacks, browns, women, gays and other stigmatized and 
marginalized persons have been in the vanguard of progressive Consti-
tutional change. It is in our interests to close the Constitution's con-
tradictions. We are liberated by the knowledge that we are in a fight 
about who we are and how we shall be constituted, and our liberation 
has served to liberate all Americans. 
During the past several weeks, as I have listened to the Iran-Con-
tra hearings, I have been struck by the presence of a countervailing 
force that threatens the vitality of this participatory struggle that is 
our Constitution's chief promise. The hearings seemed to me a golden 
opportunity for engaging the public in Constitutional debate and yet 
they appear to be having quite the opposite effect. The major media 
has played into the public's need for bread and circuses. Network cov-
erage of the hearings has replaced the soaps but there is little change in 
tone. Tom Brokaw called Ollie North a "Can Do" man without stop-
ping to ask whether we really wanted a government run by Rambo. In 
a random survey of 100 people on the street 92 knew who Fawn Hall 
was while only 20 knew the name of the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. 
Network television has done much to take the self out of self-
governance by making government a spectator sport. The adversarial 
press is fast disappearing as access to mass communication becomes 
largely a function of wealth. The media does not always tell us what 
to think, but they have been strikingly successful in telling us what to 
think about or by sheer dint of overexposure in eroding our critical 
faculties altogether. Professor Neil Postman has noted that in Hux-
ley's Brave New World "Big Brother does not watch us by his choice. 
We watch him by ours.'>22 
21. Lopez. The Idea ofa Constitution in the Chicano Tradition. 37 J. OF LEGAL ED. 162. 
163 (1987). 
22. N. POSTMAN. AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF 
SHOW BUSINESS 155-58 (1955). 
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Justice Marshall has served us well in reminding us that the 
handful of propertied white men that met in Philadelphia made us 
very few promises that we would have them keep. Even the Bill of 
Rights was a belated concession to more populist state legislatures. If 
the Constitution has any unfulfilled .promises they are those which we 
and others like us, who have gone before, have made to ourselves. It is 
we who must fight to give the due process and equal protection clauses 
a meaning that reflects our values. It is we who must insure that the 
Constitutionally regulated powers of the executive not be usurped by 
fascist fanatics who think that the buck should stop with an unelected 
military officer. It is we who must demand that our senators just say 
no to Robert Bork and any other candidate who would relegate wo-
men, gays and people of color to second class citizenship. 
In this year of the Bicentennial of our Constitution we must re-
capture the naivete and idealism about Constitutional discourse that I 
experienced as a youth. We must speak to our friends and neighbors 
face to face. We must remind them and ourselves that we are our 
Constitution's Framers and that we neglect that solemn responsibility 
at our own peril. 

